Treading the Thin Blue Line: Military Special-Operations Trained Police SWAT Teams and the Constitution by Singh, Karan R.
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 9 | Issue 3 Article 7
Treading the Thin Blue Line: Military Special-
Operations Trained Police SWAT Teams and the
Constitution
Karan R. Singh
Copyright c 2001 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
Repository Citation
Karan R. Singh, Treading the Thin Blue Line: Military Special-Operations Trained Police SWAT Teams
and the Constitution, 9 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 673 (2001), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/
vol9/iss3/7
TREADING THE THIN BLUE LINE:
MILITARY SPECIAL-OPERATIONS TRAINED POLICE
SWAT TEAMS AND THE CONSTITUTION
The increasing use of SWAT teams and paramilitary force by local law
enforcement has been the focus of a growing concern regarding the heavy-handed
exercise of police power. Critics question the constitutionality ofjoint-training
between the military and civilian police, as well as the Fourth Amendment
considerations raised by SWAT tactics. This Note examines the history, mission,
and continuing need for police SWAT teams, addressing the constitutional issues
raised concerning training and tactics. It explains how SWATjoint-training with
the military is authorized by federal law and concludes that SWAT tactics are
constitutionally acceptable in a majority of situations. Though these tactics are
legal and constitutionally authorized, this Note acknowledges the validfears critics
have regarding the abuse of such police authority, and the limitations of
constitutional tort jurisprudence in adequately redressing resulting injuries.
INTRODUCTION
Americans awoke on the morning of April 23,2000 to news images seemingly
taken from popular counterterrorist adventure movies. U.S. Border Patrol agents
with submachine guns and military-style jumpsuits had just rescued Elian Gonzalez
from the home of his Miami relatives during a pre-dawn raid.' The images were
shocking to many Americans, and Republican lawmakers who had opposed the raid
called for Congressional hearings into what they deemed an excessive use of police
force? Many law enforcement officials were surprised by this call for
Congressional review of what they deemed a routine, "by-the-book" operation.3
The Immigration and Naturalization Service defended its use of the Border Patrol
Tactical Unit by pointing to an increased threat of violence due to the tense
situation,4 but seasoned critics were wary of such aggressive governmental actions
See Karen DeYoung, Raid Reunites Elian and Father, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2000,
at AO 1 (detailing the raid events timeline).
2 See id.
3 See David Kidwell, Domestic News, MIAMI HERALD, May 2, 2000, at I ("Law
enforcement experts agree that what appears to lay people as a bunch of out-of-control
agents on testosterone overload is in truth a tactic taught at every SWAT and police training
facility.").
' See Karen DeYoung, INS Says It Feared Violence in Raid; US. Claims Many Close
to Elian's Miami Kin Were Armed, Set to Fight, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2000, at A01.
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due to their scandalous history.'
The early 1990s incidents at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and Waco, Texas, first brought
the images of paramilitary law enforcement home to American television sets. The
sight of law enforcement officers dressed in black and carrying submachine guns,
laying siege to American residences, was seen by many individuals as per se police
abuse.6 As the investigations into the aftermath of these incidents unfolded, and the
truth concerning the mismanagement of these situations became known, many
people believed the abuse of power they had witnessed was indicative of a general
trend of heavy-handedness in a law enforcement community relying heavily on
paramilitarism as police policy.7
The discussion about paramilitary police units is ongoing." For example, in
1999, the Cato Institute issued a briefing paper entitled Warrior Cops: The
Ominous Growth ofParamilitarism in American Police Departments.9 Ms. Weber
made several alarmist assertions concerning the increasing number of local law
enforcement departments maintaining Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams.
Among the concerns she raised were the relationships fostered between these teams
and the Department of Defense (DOD) through joint training exercises; the alleged
"military mindset" that is instilled in civilian units through this training; the
incompatibility of this "military mindset" with civilian law enforcement's mission;
the allegation that these SWAT units are being overdeployed for "routine" policing;
and the inference that the totality of these circumstances indicates a standing
violation of constitutional rights.'0
Such rhetoric makes great copy but does nothing to explain or resolve the
underlying legal issues inherent in the discussion. What this Note attempts to do
is to cut through the emotional rhetoric and provide an objective legal analysis of
the issue of SWAT team policing.
SWAT training with the military, and the use of that training, while an
James Bovard, Commentary, Help Promote Fewer Guns-For the Feds; After Seeing
"The Photo," Who Doesn't Fear That Lawmen Might Smash Through Their Doors at
Night?, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2000, at B9.
6 See MORRIS DEES, GATHERING STORM, 69-78 (1996).
7 See DAVID KOPEL & PAUL BLACKMAN, No MORE WACOs (1997) (analyzing alleged
errors in those ill-fated standoffs while recommending policy changes aimed at restricting
use of paramilitary-type police units in federal law enforcement agencies).
' See Megan Twohey, SWATs Under Fire, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 1, 2000, at 37; Jennifer
Autrey, Military Ties with Police Get Scrutiny, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Oct. 24, 1999,
at Al; William Booth, ExplodingNumber ofSWA Ts Sets OffAlarms, WASH. POST, June 17,
1997, at A 1; Rowan Scarborough, Military Training of Civilian Police Steadily Expands,
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1999, at Al.
9 Diane Cecilia Weber, Warrior Cops: The Ominous Growth of Paramilitarism in
American Police Departments (Cato Institute Briefing Paper No. 50, Aug. 26, 1999),
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp-050es.html.
I See id. at 1.
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emotional issue, is constitutionally valid. To support this assertion, this Note
discusses the history, mission, and continuing need for police SWAT teams.
Specifically, this Note examines the types of training SWAT teams receive,
especially from the Department of Defense, and explains howjoint training with the
military is authorized under federal law, and furthers the SWAT mission. After a
review of the constitutional restraints on police activities, this Note demonstrates
that SWAT use of military tactics may be constitutionally acceptable in a majority
of situations. This Note concludes by illustrating how the fears of critics, rightly
concerned with the potential these tactics have for constitutional violations, may be
valid, not because of any outright illegality of the SWAT tactics, but because of the
limitations of constitutional tort jurisprudence in redressing injuries.
II. NEW AGE THINKING FOR NEW AGE CRIMES
A. The Birth of a Doctrine
The 1960s was an era of upheaval in American society. Emerging from this
mix of social and political turmoil was a new crime wave characterized by an
increased use of firearms coupled with ideological zealotry." Sometimes there was
no apparent motive behind a rampage. 2 For example, Charles Whitman, an
emotionally-imbalanced veteran, climbed to the top ofthe University of Texas clock
tower and wounded forty-six people below with sniper fire, killing fifteen."3 The
Austin police, working without a coordinated anti-sniper plan, took over ninety
minutes to storm the observation deck and kill Whitman. 4  Many police
departments viewed the Whitman incident as an omen of the future, showing the
need for new approaches to police work. Former Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl
Gates, at that time a patrol area commander with the LAPD,5 is credited with
forming the first police unit specially trained to handle these high-risk situations. 6
Gates' experiences during the Watts riots of 1966 started his quest to develop
new police tactics to help control this changing face of crime. The Watts riots
found Gates and other LAPD officers in a guerrilla warfare situation, under fire
from random snipers and pelted with various objects.' 7 Traditional police tactics,
such as merely having officers present as a deterrent, were ineffective against the
" See DARYL GATES, CHIEF 110 (1992); ROBERT L. SNOW, SWAT TEAMS 6-7 (1996).
12 See GATES, supra note 11, at 109; SNOW, supra note 11, at 6.
'3 See SNOW, supra note 11, at 1-7.
"' See id. at 7; Autrey, supra note 8.
's See GATES, supra note 11, at 88, 113.
16 See Weber, supra note 9, at 6 (crediting the LAPD with forming the first Special
Weapons and Tactics Team); GATES, supra note 11, at 114 (acknowledging his reputation
as "the Father of SWAT").
'7 See GATES, supra note 11, at 95.
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disorganized rioting.'" Gates also found that traditional riot-control techniques were
equally useless due to the decentralized nature of the mobs they faced. Similarly,
the snipers that the LAPD encountered were equally beyond their capabilities.
Gates describes the established method of dealing with Watts snipers as little more
than indiscriminate shooting by the police. 9 Shortly after the end of the Watts riots,
Gates faced another serious situation that challenged his reliance on traditional
police tactics.
The Surry Street shootings were the final straw for Gates. Officers responding
to reports of a disturbance were ambushed by Jack Ray Hoxsie, who then barricaded
himself inside his home and began shooting at anyone outside.2" Hoxsie, having
used a shotgun and a rifle on the officers, apparently had an arsenal stashed inside.2
The response of other officers to this situation was to shoot back wildly, hoping to
strike Hoxsie.' Because this plan was not working, Gates decided to change his
strategy. Two officers volunteered to run up and throw tear gas into the house.
They donned the clumsy metal body armor of the era, which Gates describes as
"Knights of the Round Table stuff,"2 3 and lurched toward the house. After lobbing
tear gas grenades into a broken window, the volunteers stormed the house, located
the wounded Hoxsie lying in a hallway, and shot him as he reached for a nearby
handgun. Hoxsie survived, to be convicted later of attempted murder.24 The final
toll was four wounded: three officers and a citizen who attempted to help them.
Reflecting on the episode, Gates decided that a new, organized, approach was
needed to handle snipers or barricaded criminals.25
Gates and several other supervisors in the LAPD began studying guerrilla
warfare tactics with the goal of forming anti-sniper teams.2 6 The war in Vietnam,
ongoing at this time, was a source of guerrilla warfare information that soon led
Gates to the U.S. Marine unit at a nearby naval armory. The Marines shared their
knowledge of counterinsurgency operations and guerrilla warfare with the Gates
team. 7 Gates took this knowledge and used it to train several selected officers, in
their off-time, in rudimentary anti-sniper techniques. These officers were not
organized into any special teams, remaining in their regular police units. This lack
of cohesion was one of the first things Gates attempted to remedy.
Is See id.
'9 See id at 102.
20 See id at 108.
21 See id.
22 See id.
23 Id at 109.
24 See id.
25 See id.
I Gates and these supervisors initiated this project without official authorization from
the LAPD command. See id.
27 See id
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As part of his duties, Gates was in charge of the Metro Division. Metro was a
floating police unit formed to deal with unusual criminal activity anywhere in the
city, such as a series of bus robberies that were plaguing Los Angeles at the time.
Eventually Gates was able to have the sixty volunteer officers in his anti-sniper
program transferred to the Metro division. These anti-sniper officers became
known as the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) unit.2"
Gates already had bucked LAPD tradition by organizing Metro into ten-officer
squads, each headed by a sergeant.29 Organizing police officers into military-style
teams was considered offensive by some LAPD higher-ups. The typical reaction
to this restructuring was the comment that "the LAPD is supposed to be a civil
police force .... [t]heir job is to relate to the community, not put on combat boots
and helmets and assault the community."3 Despite the criticism, Gates believed
that changes to policing methods were needed to keep up with the changing times.3
In contrast to Metro's regular ten-officer squads, SWAT's squads were divided
further into two five-officer teams. This small-team concept was a result of the
extensive research done by the anti-sniper leaders. Gates had concluded "the most
effective way to stop a sniper or apprehend a barricaded individual was with a small
team of highly disciplined officers using specialized weapons and tactics."32 In the
LAPD, these teams were the basic SWAT units, comprised of a team leader, a
sniper, an observer, a scout, and a rear guard.33
B. The New Police at Work
Since Daryl Gates christened his Special Weapons and Tactics unit in the late
1960s, police departments across the country have formed their own special units
to handle high-risk situations.34 The rationale for maintaining these teams is
generally the same:
[W]hile average police officers, in their traditional role as peace keepers,
are trained and equipped to handle any number of aberrant human
behaviors, they are simply not trained and equipped to handle incidents
28 This name was adopted after the LAPD deputy chief rejected the original moniker of
"Special Weapons Attack Teams." Id at 114.
29 See id.
30 Id at ll6.
31 See id. at 114-15.
32 Id. at 114.
33 See id
34 "There are now an estimated 3,000 SWAT units throughout the nation." Janice Morse,
SWA T Teams Sharpen Skills, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, May 6, 1999, at B3; see also Twohey,
supra note 8, at 41 ("Thirty years [after the Whitman incident], not only the number, but the
size and scope of SWAT teams have grown significantly.").
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in which people with high-destruction weapons have taken hostages and
are holed up in a fortified location. Nor are they trained and equipped
to handle incidents in which the slightest slip could cost many lives."
There has been no shortage of need for these special police units. 6
1. Daryl Gates' SWAT in action
The first major use of a SWAT team was the LAPD team's deployment in 1969
against a local group of Black Panthers." The Black Panthers were a nationally
known radical activist group that dabbled in 1960s-era leftist revolutionary
politics.38 The Black Panthers were distinguished from other radical groups by their
advocacy of the black community's armed self-defense. Black Panthers were
known to be armed and often dangerous.39
SWAT's mission was to serve an arrest warrant against two'Black Panthers.
High-risk warrant service is a typical SWAT mission.4 The Panthers in question
were sought for using a shotgun and a forty-five caliber pistol to threaten a police
officer called to the area by neighbors complaining of a disturbance. The arrest
plan called for a SWAT team to conduct an initial pre-dawn building entry,
followed by police officers, who would assist in securing the premises." SWAT
was relying on the element of surprise to keep the Panthers at a disadvantage.
SWAT's job was to make the initial entry into the building in order to quickly take
35 SNOW, supra note 11, at 16. This concept of the SWAT mission has been cited by
police departments across the U.S. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 8, at Al ("Fresno Police
Chief Ed Winchester says that a highly armed and more violent criminal class requires an
extreme response."); Lt. Dennis Fortunado, Fond du Lac, W, Police Department SWAT
Team Home Page, at http://www.fdlpolice.com/swat.htm ("The SWAT team is utilized
when our department is required to resolve a 'high risk incident' in which there is a threat
of a weapon ... ");.
36 See SNOW, supra note 11, at 249 ("[P]olice SWAT teams have met with hundreds of
successes and saved countless lives."); Megan Twohey, Five Communities, Five Stories,
NAT'L J., Jan. 1, 2000, at 38 (describing several geographically-diverse police department
SWAT units, including the number of times each SWAT team is deployed each year).
3 Gates cites this as the LAPD's first mission. See GATES, supra note 11, at 119.
38 See id. at l l7.
39 See id. at 118.
See SNOW, supranote 11, at 10-11.
*' This plan did not work as expected. The SWAT team's element of surprise was lost
due to the Black Panthers' lookouts forewarning them of the SWAT team's approach. The
result was a firefight between the Black Panthers and the SWAT team before the team could
even enter the Panthers' house. The Black Panthers eventually surrendered after hours of
negotiation. The final casualty figures were six arrests, three wounded arrestees, and three
wounded police officers. Gates does not indicate if any of the wounded officers were SWAT
members. See GATES, supra note 11, at 119-23.
[Vol. 9:3
TREADING THE THIN BLUE LINE
control of the situation, thereby providing the follow-on force with a safe
environment in which to perform their arrest duties.
The next high-profile LAPD SWAT mission was the 1974 operation against the
Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA). The SLA was a leftist revolutionary
organization operating in the United States. Though having a political ideology
similar to that of the Black Panthers, the SLA differed by focusing less on racial
politics; instead, expressly advocating class warfare in the United States. 42 The
SLA committed a string of crimes, including a bank robbery, an assassination, and
the kidnapping of Patty Hearst, heiress to the Hearst publishing fortune, as their
"campaign" continued across the U.S.43
Six months after the Patty Hearst kidnapping, several SLA members were
discovered in the Los Angeles area. They gained the LAPD's attention after they
tried submachine-gunning a store clerk who attempted to prevent two SLA members
from shoplifting socks. The discovery of the SLA in Los Angeles resulted in a
combined effort of local and federal law enforcement to arrest the SLA members.
Due to the SLA's violence and fanaticism, this was considered to be the type of
high-risk arrest mission that required SWAT's expertise. 44
The SLA mission involved the services of both the LAPD and local FBI office
SWAT teams.45 After FBI and LAPD teams surrounded the suspected SLA hideout,
the scene commander in charge of the operation ordered the SLA members to
surrender and come out of the house. The SLA refused to surrender or negotiate
with the SWAT teams. At this point a tear gas grenade was fired into the house in
an attempt to flush out the SLA members. Instead of surrendering, the SLA
members started shooting at the teams. Both sides fired over nine thousand rounds
of ammunition during this shootout. The small wood-frame house in which the six
SLA members were hiding suddenly caught fire. Firefighters on the scene refused
to approach the house due to the continuing shootout. The SLA members refused
to stop firing or to surrender, eventually perishing in the fire that burned the house
to the ground. The operation was a terrible disappointment; SWAT's mission was
to get everyone out alive.46
42 See id at 131.
" See id. In a bizarre twist, Hearst joined the SLA after being kidnapped, helping them
rob a San Francisco bank. See id
44 See id.
"' Each FBI field office has its own SWAT teams for high-risk arrest missions. There
are nine additional "enhanced SWAT" teams at FBI field offices in major metropolitan
areas. See C.F. TOMAJCZYK, U.S. ELITE COUNTER-TERRORIST FORCES 68 (1997).
46 See GATES, supra note 11, at 115 ("If anybody gets killed or injured, the operation's
a failure.... ").
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III. SWAT MISSION TYPES
A. The Basic Premise
Though their names may differ-Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT),
Special Response Team (SRT), Emergency Response Team (ERT), Special
Emergency Response Teams (SERT), Emergency Services Unit (ESU)-police
special units share the same goal: resolving the incident without innocent parties
being seriously injured or killed.47
In the years since the LAPD SWAT team was formed, the majority of police
departments either have formed their own special response teams or have access to
special response services.48  Eighty-nine percent of departments serving
communities of 50,000 or more have SWAT units supporting them.49 Practically
every federal law enforcement agency has a special response team, the first being
the U.S. Marshal Service's Special Operations Group, formed in 1971 .50 Reflecting
the diversity ofjurisdictions, the types of situations that may call for a SWAT-type
mission vary.
Due to the absence of national guidelines, local police departments decide for
themselves when to utilize a SWAT team.51 "However, since police SWAT teams
are trained and equipped to handle high-risk incidents, and therefore often carry
high-destruction weaponry, their use is usually, but not always tightly controlled."52
Federal agencies often have directives or internal restrictions on when they can
deploy their tactical units.5' Despite this wide discretion in usage, most SWAT
missions share similar profiles.54
B. SWAT Mission Profiles
The majority of SWAT missions are high-risk search or arrest warrant services,
47 See GATES, supra note 11, at 115, 116 ("The goal is always the same: Get everyone
out safely."); SNOW, supra note 11, at 286; Morse, supra note 34 ("[W]e're not a bunch of
overaggressive officers with too much testosterone .... We're a team that's trained to rescue
people and save lives.") (quoting a Hamilton, Ohio, SWAT officer).
48 See Twohey, supra note 8 (citing researchers both critical and supportive of this rise
in number). The acronym "SWAT" is used in this Note to refer to any of these special units.
49 Id.
so See TOMAJCZYK, supra note 45, at 71.
5' SNOW, supra note 11, at 10.
52 See SNOW, supra note 11, at 11.
53 See TOMAJCZYK, supra note 45, at 68-69, 81 (describing the bureaucratic protocol
necessary before the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and the U.S. Marshall Service
Special Operations Group (SOG) may be deployed).
14 See SNOW, supra note 11, at 10.
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hostage situations, or barricaded armed-person incidents." Other missions may
include vehicle hijacking response, anti-sniper operations, or stakeouts for high-risk
arrest scenarios, such as an expected bank robbery or gang fight.56 All of these
operations share an enhanced risk to public safety requiring a specialized response.
Municipal SWAT units, like their federal counterparts, do not participate in
missions on their own initiative-they become involved only after a request for
their assistance has been made." This request may come either in the midst of a
crisis or in the planning stages of an impending police action. In a typical crisis
situation, the police officer in charge on the scene assesses the situation and decides
whether SWAT services are needed.5" If so, the SWAT team will arrive on the
scene and, depending on the police department's operating procedures, either take
over the situation 9 or develop a plan that must be approved by the officer in
charge.' In other situations, such as warrant service or stakeouts, the request for
SWAT assistance can come early in the planning stages of the operation.
In any case, SWAT commanders undertake extensive mission planning before
entering a tactical situation.6' Such planning involves deciding how best to
approach a given situation based on the information available. This information
includes, for example, building layouts, structural hazards such as barricaded doors
or booby traps, the number of hostages or suspects involved, what types of weapons
are involved.62 This level of detail is required to ensure that the proposed operation
will have a high probability of success. If the planning is flawed, tragedies such as
hostage deaths or team casualties may be the consequences.63
55 See id. at 157, 203,219.
56 See id at 10.
17 See GATES, supra note 11, at 116; TOMmCZYK, supra note 45, at 81 (describing the
deployment requirements for the U.S. Marshal Service SOG).
S" See GATES, supra note 11, at 116 ("At that point we call SWAT."); SNOW, supra note
11, at 146 (discussing that the first police officer on the scene of a Portland, Oregon, bank
robbery requested assistance from the Portland SERT team). Local SWAT teams themselves
may determine that a hostage situation is beyond their capabilities and call on the FBI's
Hostage Rescue Team. TOMAJCZYK, supra note 45, at 68.
. "9 See SNOW, supra note 11, at 146-47 (describing how the Portland, Oregon, SWAT
team took control of a crisis bank robbery-turned-hostage situation from the on-scene patrol
officers).
o See GATES, supra note 11, at 116.
61 See SNOW, supra note 11, at 55-56.
62 See TOMAJCZYK, supra note 45, at 114-15 (emphasizing the importance of planning).
63 See, e.g., Steve Visser & Brad Schrade, The SWA T Team: Report: RaidPlan Flawed,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 9, 2000, at CI (describing how poor planning and bad .tactics
contributed to the deaths of two SWAT team officers during a failed hostage rescue
attempt).
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C. The Bulk of the Work: Missions and Tactics
1. High-Risk Warrant Service
High-risk warrant service makes up the largest number of SWAT operations."
SWAT teams execute both search and arrest warrants whenever the police
department is worried about a violent reaction from the warrant target. SWAT
typically performs the initial entry into the premises in order to secure it safely
before the officers tasked with the actual search or arrest enter. Entry into the place
of service can be accomplished in varying ways.
The obvious and safest method of entry is to knock on the door and announce
the police presence and purpose for being there. However, most high-risk warrant
service is done in situations that unreasonably would place police officers in danger
by announcing their presence.65 In other situations the person on the other side of
the door refuses to let the officers in, as witnessed in the LAPD's Black Panthers
and SLA incidents." In these cases a "dynamic entry" is conducted--so called due
to the violence and swiftness it entails.
Dynamic entries can be accomplished either by breaching a door or window or
by creating an entrance through a wall.67 The most common entry method is by
door, but in some situations, such as when the doors may be barricaded or tactical
considerations may warrant, entry may be made by other means, for example,
through a wall or the roof." Entry can be accomplished by a combination of
mechanical, explosive, or ammunition-based methods.
Doors can be breached mechanically using "hooligan tools," battering rams, or
by chaining the door to a tow truck that then pulls the door off. Battering rams are
most often a steel tube with handles, carried by several SWAT members and used
to bash a door in.69 "Hooligan tools" are special pickax-like devices used to pry
open doors. Reinforced doorways are removed by the "chaining-to-the-vehicle"
method. Due to the danger resulting from flying debris, SWAT teams avoid
6 See SNOW, supra note 11, at 221; Autrey, supra note 8, at A l ("[R]esearch determined
that about 85 percent of SWAT teams are eventually used for no-knock drug raids on private
residences.").
65 See Twohey, supra note 8 at 42 ("SWAT teams should step in to deliver warrants if
1) The suspect has a propensity toward violence; 2) the police know that a high number of
weapons or particularly lethal weapons are present; or 3) the location is heavily fortified.").
66 See supra text accompanying notes 37-46.
67 See TOMAJCzYK, supra note 45, at 115.
See id.
Robert Snow points out that the LAPD once used mechanical battering rains but were
forced to abandon their use after damage and injury caused by its extreme force prompted
lawsuits against the city. SNOW, supra note 11, at 104.
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explosive-assisted entries in favor of the mechanical methods detailed.70 However,
some tactical situations may leave no other choice but to use explosives.
Explosives can be used either to blow a door completely down or cut a small
"mouse hole" through the door or a wall.7' Explosives used by police SWAT teams
include plastic explosives; shaped charges, so called because they are designed and
shaped to focus the detonation energy in one direction; a caulk-like explosive that
is applied with a calk gun; "Foamex," which is applied with a spray can; and "linear
flex shaped charges," originally used by the construction industry to cut steel beams
and very efficient at breaching reinforced steel doors. 2
Ammunition-based methods use firearms to help gain entrance. This can be
accomplished by using regular submachine gun, pistol, or shotgun ammunition to
damage or destroy locks or windows by simply firing at them.73 A special shotgun
round called a Shock-Lock round, containing plaster and metal dust, can be used to
safely destroy a lock without injuring a person standing on the other side of the
door. 4 The plaster and dust disintegrate on impact, transferring the kinetic energy
into the lock or hinge without penetrating beyond the door. 5 Such a round will
produce a hole in one side of a metal oil drum without penetrating the other side.76
High risk warrant service, unlike many other SWAT missions, typically allows
for a considerable amount of preparation time before an operation because SWAT
commanders usually are involved in operational planning from the early stages."
This large preparation time is possible due to the fact that these situations are
usually known ahead of time, allowing for a high level of cooperation between the
SWAT teams and the requesting police unit. Planning and preparation for a warrant
service may include researching the background of the target, identifying the
reasons for classifying the service a "high-risk" event, studying building blueprints,
gathering intelligence on the targeted structure (e.g., movement or sleep patterns of
occupants, identifying potential cover and concealment areas for the SWAT
members approaching the structure), planning and rehearsing the building entry and
security plan, and securing the assistance of support personnel such as medics or
negotiators."
70 See id. at 103.
71 See TOMAJCZYK, supra note 45, at 116.
7 See SNOW, supra note 11, at 103-05.
71 See id. at 105.
' See id
71 See id.
76 See id
7 See GATES, supra note 11, at 119 (noting SWAT had a week to plan the Black
Panthers arrest); SNOW, supra note 11, at 223 (explaining how Indianapolis narcotics
officers asked for SWAT assistance as soon as they obtained a search warrant for an illegal
drug manufacturing site).
78 See TOMAJCZYK, supra note 45, at 114-15.
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2. Hostage Situations/Barricaded Individuals
Confronting hostage situations and armed individuals are usually the images
conjured up when people are asked what SWAT teams do. These situations,
however, make up a comparatively small number of missions when compared to the
warrant-service operations. 9 SWAT teams are used in these situations to provide
specialized skills designed to approach high-stress, high-risk situations with a
coordinated plan that ensures the smallest possible risk to life. 0
SWAT teams constantly are improving their techniques and strategies in order
to arrive at the best plan for a given situation. Robert L. Snow states that this
progressive improvement has resulted in the following five steps for handling a
hostage or barricaded armed individual situation:
1. Contain and isolate the suspect; then attempt to negotiate a surrender.
2. If unsuccessful, demand that the suspect surrender.
3. If unsuccessful, use chemical weapons [i.e., tear gas] to force the suspect to
surrender.
4. If unsuccessful, use snipers to neutralize the suspect.
5. If unsuccessful, order a SWAT assault [using applicable warrant service
techniques].
Snow states that the SWAT commander always must start at step one and work
his/her way down to step four or five: "The guiding principle is that before using
Step 4 or 5, all possibilities of resolving the incident peacefully must first be
investigated and attempted." 2 The FBI Hostage Rescue Team, though a federal
unit, is under a similar last-resort policy. 13 This policy emphasis on the use of force
as a last resort conflicts with the perception by some that SWAT teams approach
situations with their guns blazing, itching to show off their firepower and training."
The use of force as a last resort is heavily emphasized in police training."5 SWAT
"' See Booth, supra note 8, at A l (citing research showing that only seventeen percent
of SWAT missions involved these situations, while seventy-five percent involved high-risk
warrant service).
80 See Twohey, supra note 8 ("[A] SWAT team's overwhelming show of force often
ensures that no shots are fired.").
s' See SNOW, supra note 11, at 76.
82 See id at 76.
83 See TOMAJCZYK, supra note 45, at 68-69 (quoting a senior FBI official stating that
"[tihe HRT was never intended to be used as a first strike capability.").
84 See Autrey, supra note 8 ("[Critics worry] that even the best of officers might use
more force than necessary in the desire to apply the skills and weapons they have
acquired.").
"5 See Beth Dove, Keeping Up With Modern Crooks, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 28, 1999,
at B2 ("On an ascending scale of deadliness, the [force] levels begin with the mere presence
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training, which builds off of these basic police principles, has even been described
as shifting emphasis from firepower to negotiation and the use of less-than-lethal
force. 6
IV. SWAT TRAINING
A. Officer Selection
The selection process of most SWAT units is extremely demanding. The
situations SWAT officers may find themselves facing require firearms proficiency,
extreme discipline, physical fitness, emotional stability, the ability to work with
others as a team, and above average intelligence/aptitude for critical thinking to
resolve them successfully.8" Candidates for such a position are subject to rigid
scrutiny to ensure they have these qualities.
SWAT members are typically volunteers from the regular force. For example,
the LAPD requires its SWAT candidates to have a minimum of four years regular
police duty with the LAPD.89 Admission to a department's SWAT team comes
after a lengthy selection process." Robert L. Snow has conducted a study of over
thirty U.S. municipal SWAT team selection processes.' Snow reports that SWAT
selection typically entails a series of written, oral, and physical tests.' Many
departments also include a background investigation and psychological screening
of candidates.93 Some departments also require firearms proficiency tests.94
of an officer, progressing to verbal commands, aerosol defensive tools, hands-on-force,
and-fmally--deadly force.").
86 See Morse, supra note 34 ("SWAT training is focusing increasingly on communication
skills and using less-than-lethal force.") (quoting SWAT consultant Al Preciado, who was
interviewed during training involving Cincinnati, Ohio, area departments).
87 See SNOW, supra note 11, at 26, 28.
88 See GATES, supra note 11, at 114 (describing the recruitment and selection of the first
SWAT candidates); SNOW, supra note 11, at 28; TOMAJCZYK, supra note 45, at 54
(describing the FBI's HRT application/selection process), 74 (describing the U.S. Marshall
Service's Special Operation Group's selection process).
89 See Twohey, supra note 8 ("[LAPD SWAT applicants] must have at least four years
with the department before applying.").
" See id. (describing the training requirements for several different police departments'
SWAT teams).
91 See id.
92 See id.
9' See id.
4 See id.
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B. Close Quarters Battle Skills
SWAT teams, by their mission, are confronted with situations necessitating the
potential tactical assault of a crisis site." These sites are typically building
structures. This fact does not change regardless of the mission: warrant service and
confronting barricaded individuals both require knowledge of site assault
techniques. The armed assault of such a closely-confined area, for the purpose of
protecting life with the least amount of force necessary, requires the proficient use
of highly specialized skills known as Close Quarters Battle (CQB) skills."
CQB training consists of entry/breaching tactics, tactical movement once inside
buildings, room assault tactics, and techniques in confronting hostage takers.97
"Officers must know how to enter a room as a team, and how to enter a room
without running into each other, without being caught in crossfire, and without
being shot by the perpetrator." 8 This training, which may mean the difference
between the life and death of hostages or the SWAT members," must be as realistic
and intense as possible to ensure proficiency among the SWAT members. " SWAT
teams receive CQB training from national police organizations, firearms companies,
and from private consulting groups.'0 ' In the search for the most realistic,
beneficial, and intensive CQB training possible, many SWAT units have
coordinated training with U.S. military counter-terrorist forces.'
0 2
C. SWAT Training with the Department of Defense
The history of joint military/SWAT training can be traced to Daryl Gates'
affiliation with local Marine units stationed near Los Angeles." 3 Gates sought the
Marines' expertise in dealing with snipers, guerrilla warfare, and small unit
" See supra text accompanying notes 55-86 (discussing SWAT mission profiles, such
as high-risk warrant service and hostage situations, and accompanying tactics).
" For a good description of these types of tactics, see TOMAJCZYK, supra note 45, at
114-18.
9 See SNOW, supra note 11, at 134; TOMAJCZYK, supra note 45, at 114-18.
98 See SNOW, supra note 11, at 136.
" See id. at 131 ("It has been found in SWAT incidents that the majority of injuries and
deaths to both police officers and hostages occur during assaults and hostage-rescue
attempts.").
1o0 See id.
101 See, e.g., Twohey, supra note 8.
1o2 See David B. Kopel & Paul M. Blackman, Can Soldiers Be Peace Officers? The
Waco Disaster and the Militarization ofAmerican Law Enforcement, 30 AKRON L. REV.
619, 651 (1997) ("The Navy SEALs and Army Rangers both conduct extensive training of
paramilitary units such as local police SWAT teams.").
"03 See GATES, supra note 11, at 109.
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tactics.'"" Modem SWAT teams have a similar rationale for continuing this
training.105
The U.S. military's counter-terrorist forces tasked to handle overseas hostage
rescue missions are Delta Force and the Navy SEALs.' °' These units receive and
develop specialized training in hostage rescue tactics involving CQB. °7 Local
SWAT teams looking to improve their own training programs gladly cross-train
with these units to acquire skills relevant to their mission.',
This cross-training is a controversial aspect of SWAT policing due to the
constitutional implications arising from the use of military tactics against
civilians.'" The question that should be asked is what type of training is being
used, not whether any military tactics are being used. CQB skills honed by the
military would help to further a SWAT team's mission of saving lives by enhancing
their ability to safely conduct site assaults. Shooting discipline, drills compelling
instant recognition of friends or foes, small unit movement, and breaching
techniques all play a part in ensuring a SWAT team reacts cogently and intelligently
to a situation."0 The reason civilian SWAT teams require this training and do not
104 See id. at 109, 110, 115 ("Regularly, we sent squads to train at Camp Pendleton,
trading expertise with the Marines."). The FBI's Hostage Rescue Team is the primary
federal domestic hostage rescue force. The military units are prohibited by the Posse
Comitatus Act from operating within the U.S. without express presidential authorization.
"' According to one study, forty-three percent of the SWAT teams polled received
training from active-duty military special-operations units. See Autrey, supra note 8 at Al.
'06 See SUSAN L. MARQUIS, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, 63-65 (describing the
formation of Delta Force from existing U.S. Army Special Forces (AKA "Green Beret")
personnel); TOMAJCZYK, supra note 45, at 43 (explaining that though all SEAL teams are
trained in counter-terrorist tactics, one team known as Seal Team Six or "Development
Group/DevGroup", has counter-terrorism as its primary mission.).
107 See TOMACZYK, supra note 45, at 43.
1"s See Autrey, supra note gat A ("Since SWAT teams were formed, special-forces units
such as the Army's Delta Force and the Navy SEALs have been involved in training police
in the use of military techniques and equipment.").
Weber concedes that the training received by civilian SWAT teams is tempered by the
restrictions of civilian police work. She quotes one recipient of this training as stating: "We
just have to use our judgment and exclude information like: 'at this point we bring in the
mortars and blow the place up."' Weber, supra note 9, at 9 (quoting Peter Kraska and Victor
Kappeler, Militarizing American Police: The Rise andNormalization ofParamilitary Units,
44 SOC. PROBLEMS 5-6 (1997)). According to the Arlington, Texas, SWAT commander,
"[the military] teach[es] us tactics. They don't teach us how to do our business." Autrey,
supra note 8 at Al. The military also restricts such training to those skills it deems relevant
to the civilian law enforcement mission. See id. ("Military spokesmen said that training
offered to police is limited to what the-armed services deem acceptable.").
W9 The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the use of "unreasonable" force
against U.S. residents. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
"0 See TOMAJCZYK, supra note 45, at 114-17.
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simply allow the military to perform these missions is a legal one: the skills that the
military has developed cannot be used by the military to resolve a domestic law
enforcement matter because the military is ordinarily precluded from assisting in
domestic law enforcement activities by the Posse Comitatus Act."'
1. The Posse Comitatus Act
The Posse Comitatus Act was passed shortly after the Civil War as a response
to Southern anger over Union troops' occupation of the South."' The Act bars any
federal military unit from participating in domestic law enforcement activities
without express Presidential decree.' Though the Act is still in effect, its weight
has been reduced by the 1981 Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act, 10
U.S.C. §§ 371-74. Weber summarizes the effect of this law:
That law amended the Posse Comitatus Act insofar as it authorized the
military to "assist" civilian police in the enforcement of drug laws. The
act encouraged the military to (a) make available equipment, military
bases, and research facilities to federal, state, and local police; (b) train
and advise civilian police on the use of the equipment; and (c) assist law
enforcement personnel in keeping drugs from entering the country. The
act also authorized the military to share information acquired during
military operations with civilian law enforcement agencies. 4
The basis for this controversial law authorizing such training generally is regarded
as a policy decision stemming from the government's response to the drug trade.'
This loophole allows the Department of Defense to share practically any
information and equipment with civilian law enforcement agencies as long as the
rubric of "fighting the drug war" is applicable. "6 Such a rationale could extend to
virtually any police operation because the drug trade has become pervasive." 7
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1994).
I 2 Major Kirk L. Davies, The Imposition of Martial Law in the United States, 49 A.F. L.
REV. 67, 79 (2000).
" See id. at 79-80.
"4 Weber, supra note 9, at 4 (emphasis added).
' See Kopel & Blackman, supra note 102, at 652.
116 See id. at 653-54.
"' See Dove, supra note 85, at B2 ("[O]fficers themselves see the terrain [of modem-day
crime] as a volatile mix of violent gangs, drugs that feed aggression, and guns and more guns
in the wrong hands.").
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2. Types of training given by the military
Many different military units are involved in training civilian SWAT units,
from local bases to Special Forces units, to the U.S. Army Military Police School.'
"Every region of the United States now has a Joint Task Force staff in charge of
coordinating military involvement in domestic law enforcement.""' 9 Joint Task
Force Six (JTF-6), based in Fort Bliss, Texas, and organized in 1991, is the
Pentagon's single largest organization dedicated to civilian law enforcement. It
coordinates the military's most systematic training for domestic law enforcement
agencies. 0 JTF-6 has a permanent staff of 170, but can request additional
manpower as training needs arise. JTF-6 "tapped 3,000 military persons for the war
on drugs and trained 2,700 law enforcement officers in 1999." ' Special operations
personnel attached to JTF-6 teach civilian law enforcement such skills as
camouflage techniques, individual and team tactical movement, booby trap removal,
combat shooting techniques, urban warfare tactics, first aid, and mission
planning.'22 Other JTF-6 military trainers teach drug raid techniques, nighttime
shooting skills, and the use of night-vision devices.2 3 The Army M.P. School
teaches field tactical police operations, courses in the phenomena of narco-
terrorism, and special-reaction-team training'
The sharing of military information concerning "tactical operations" ostensibly
includes information involving CQB training.' Once these CQB tactics are
learned, they can be applied to any CQB situation, notjust incidents involving drug
arrests. Unfortunately, the need for SWAT's CQB skills is not limited to incidents
involving the drug trade.
"' See Autrey, supra note 8 at A1; Twohey, supra note 8.
"9 KOPEL & BLACKMAN, supra note 7, at 341.
10 See Scarborough, supra note 8; Twohey, supra note 8.
"' Scarborough, supra note 8.
1n See id
123 See id
14 See Twohey, supra note 8.
12 The authorbases this assertion on his own military experience, which included training
in basic CQB skills under the rubric of "tactical operations."
Knowledge gained through CQB training may also include information derived from
studying the reactions of opponents to different tactics. Robert L. Snow includes such
information in his book, SWAT Teams: "Research by the U.S. Army's Operation Counter-
Terrorist Unit has found that, when surprised, a person generally needs five seconds to
regain the ability to react." SNOW, supra note 11, at 186.
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V. THE CONTINUING NEED FOR SWAT UNITS
A. Introduction
Law enforcement agencies in America are faced with a cavalcade of high-risk
threats to public safety requiring a SWAT team's expertise. In addition to the drug
trade targeted by the Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act,'26 police are
faced with a host of public threats, including religious zealots (of many faiths),
racist ideologues, the so-called "militia movement," foreign and domestic terrorist
groups, and gangs. These threats are not confined to urban areas; rural police face
many of the same social deviants the larger cities face, as well as other concerns
unique to rural policing.
B. The Drug Trade
The violence and social costs resulting from the presence of illegal drugs in
America is a subject that surpasses the scope of this Note. The topic is relevant in
so far as it helps to illustrate the motivation behind government's allowing
cooperative training between SWAT teams and special operations forces. 27 Drug
dealers in American society have been portrayed (rightfully) as a serious threat to
public safety, necessitating a heavy-handed law enforcement response.' 2S Police
Captain Robert L. Snow describes the effect drugs have had on law enforcement:
[C]riminals now know that, if they are arrested and convicted of drug
dealing, they face long prison sentences .... These dealers [also] have
the money to purchase high-tech assault weapons, often better weapons
than the average police officer has. And because these criminals know
they face long sentences if arrested and convicted of drug dealing, they
have begun resisting arrest with increased vigor and deadliness ....
Therefore, the danger involved in serving arrest and search warrants,
particularly against drug dealers and drug locations, has become so great
in many communities that the police departments now use their SWAT
teams almost exclusively to serve these high-risk warrants, and
particularly to serve them at fortified locations .... 129
126 See Kopel & Blackman, supra note 102, at 652 ("The major cause of the militarization
of American law enforcement has been the 'drug war."' (continuing on to describe the
purpose of the Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act)).
127 See, e.g., id. (criticizing the "Drug War" approach to law enforcement).
121 See SNOW, supra note 11, at 223 ("[T]he use of much of a police SWAT team's time
serving high-risk warrants has come about because drug dealers have so increased their
affinity for violence.").
129 See id at 221-22.
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With no end in sight to stopping the flow of illegal drugs into America's streets,
SWAT units' deployments to deal with situations spawned by the drug trade
certainly will continue.
C. Gangs and Organized Crime
According to the FBI, "[o]ne of the most disturbing crime trends facing our
country is the increase of violent street gangs. .. "' U.S. Department of Justice
statistics indicate that "law enforcement agencies in the United States are
confronted with the presence of more than 4,800 gangs and 250,000 gang
members."'' Unlike the Sharks and the Jets in West Side Story, these modem gangs
are "[h]eavily armed with sophisticated weapons [and] are involved in drug
trafficking, murder, witness intimidation, robbery, extortion, and turf battles."'1
32
Daryl Gates reports that gang members in Los Angeles murdered over seven
hundred people in 1991." Gates also gives an example of the sort of mentality
found in the ranks of gang membership:
Charlotte Austin stood in court Friday and looked right at the five gang
members who fired 11 bullets into the body of her 13-year-old daughter.
"You took my child and shot her like she was an animal!" she
shouted .... "Your souls are going to hell." But as she spoke, two of
the men laughed. Later, as convicted killer Deautri Denard stood to
leave, he announced with a smirk, "Gangsterism continues," and flashed
[his gang's trademark hand signal].'34
Gang-related, and to a lesser extent organized crime, violence is present in
American communities of every size, from large cities to small ones, rural areas,
and even suburbs.1 3' Gangs are even a problem in the state of Utah, where an
130 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ENSURING PUBLIC
SAFETY AND NATIONAL SECURITY UNDER THE RULE OF LAW: A REPORT TO THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE ON THE WORK OF THE FBI 1993-1998, 48 (1999).
131 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, URBAN STREET GANG
ENFORCEMENT, at xiii (1997) [hereinafter DOJ/GANGS].
132 Id. at iii.
133 See GATES, supra note 11, at 298.
134 Id. at 289.
131 See DOJ/GANGS, supra note 131, at iii ("Gangs now operate in cities of all sizes, as
well as suburban communities throughout the United States; gang violence is no longer
limited to major cities."); National Institute for Justice Research Report, CRIME AND
POLICING IN RURALAND SMALL-TOWN AMERICA 37-40 (1995) [hereinafter NIJ] (discussing
the factors behind gang activity in rural areas). The NIJ report mentions the interesting
phenomena of the gang "franchise" or "branch office" established in rural communities by
juvenile urban transplants. Id. at 39. As if gangs weren't enough: "there is good reason to
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estimated 200 to 300 gangs are estimated to have 4000 to 5000 members in the
state. 36 Many gangs are organized along ethnic groups, bringing a new dimension
to the phenomena:
As the ethnic makeup of the country has changed, so has the face of
organized crime. A new generation of immigrants has been following
patterns of criminal activity remarkably similar to those first established
by Irish, Italian, and Jewish immigrants.... [I]llegal narcotics ... has
made it possible for organized crime groups to thrive in a number of
ways, including the constant armed robberies, home invasions, violent
extortions, and other assorted crimes ... 
As the U.S. becomes a more heterogeneous society due to immigration and
demographic trends, the threat posed by these ethnic gangs will increase."'3 Regular
police strategies may help combat this problem, 39 but these will have to be backed
up by SWAT's ability to respond to high-risk threats to the public."
D. Religious Zealots
The Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution ensures U.S. residents'
believe that vice and organized crime are features of the rural environment." Id. at43 (citing
Gary Potter and Larry K. Gaines, The Organizing of Crime in Appalachia, Paper presented
to the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences (Denver, Colo. 1990)).
136 See Dove, supra note 85 at B2.
131 T.J. ENGLISH, BORN TO KILL 287 (1995). Born to Kill is an excellent documentary of
the joint Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) and FBI investigation of a
notorious Vietnamese gang named "Born to Kill" that operated in New York City and
elsewhere in America.
131 See id. at 289 ("Only recently ... has the issue of Asian organized crime been labeled
a significant national problem."); GATES, supra note 11, at 293. Gates states:
Hispanic gangs [in L.A.] claim more than 18,000 followers, and Hispanic
gang activity now accounts for 50 percent of the city's gang violence. The 37
Asian gangs have roughly 2,000 members; the various offshoots of the
Bloods and Crips number about 15,000 members. Altogether, [the LAPD has]
identified 474 different gangs with a total membership of 35,000.
Id.
13" The LAPD implemented "Operation Hammer" in 1988 to help combat the L.A. gangs.
This task required as many as a thousand officers, resulting in monumental overtime costs
that eventually caused the operation to halt as the department ran out of money See GATES,
supra note 11, at 293-94.
"4 In a bizarre twist to the organized crime threat, Coast Guard officials report an
escalating threat of violent confrontations with immigrant smugglers. See Robert Suro,
Smuggling Patrols Face Violence at Sea, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2000, at A 1.
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freedom to follow their individual religious beliefs."" This legal protection of
religion allows many smaller, more obscure sects and cults to flourish in America.
While the majority of these groups are benign, 4 2 several are characterized by racist
ideologies, conspiracy theories, or apocalyptic beliefs. The FBI went so far as to
warn of the violent potential posed by these latter religious groups in its 1999
Project Meggiddo report. 43
The most recent manifestation of American religious zealotry can be seen in
the violent wing of the anti-reproductive-choice movement, especially in the central
anti-abortion organization known as "'The Army of God,' which has declared
armed holy war against abortion providers."'" Army of God members have been
either convicted or indicted for a string of shootings, bombings, and robberies in
furtherance of their cause, 45 and two members have been placed on the FBI's Ten
Most Wanted list.'4" One other Army of God member escaped from an Illinois state
prison in February, 2001,147 and several suspected Army of God members were
arrested that same month in Oregon after a SWAT raid by local sheriffs'
departments yielded bomb-making materials similar to those used in the 1995
Oklahoma City bombing, plastic explosives, machine guns, and undescribed "timing
devices," ostensibly for explosives.4
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently ruled that the anti-
reproductive-choice website known as "The Nuremburg Files,"' 49 which lists the
names and addresses of reproductive health care workers and their families while
calling them "baby butchers,"' ° is protected by the First Amendment from being
labeled a "threat" against reproductive health care workers and their affiliates.1'
14' U.S. CONST. amend. I.
'42 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, PROJECT MEGGiDDO 28 (1999), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/library/megiddo/publicmegiddo.pdf("Of the nearly 1000 cults operating
in the [U.S.], very few present credible threats for millennial violence.").
143 See id. at 8-10, 26-29.
'44 Dennis Roddy, Escapee Ready to Do God's Will at Gunpoint, PITrSBURGH POST-
GAZETrE, Feb. 24, 2001, at D-1.
' See Henry Weinstein, Free-Speech Ruling Boon For Abortion Foes, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
29, 2001, at Al.
'" See http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/topten/fugitives/fugitives.htm (listing James Charles
Kopp, arrested in France on Mar. 29, 2001, and Eric Robert Rudolph, still at large).
"" See Roddy, supra note 144, at D-I ("Waagner said that God had spoken to him, called
on him to shoot abortionists[,] and suspected [that God] was mightily disappointed that
Waagner [hadn't done so yet].").
148 See David Siders, Officers Pore Over Items from Sandy Raid, OREGONIAN, Feb. 13,
2001, at B02.
149 See Nuremburg Files, The Nuremburg Files, at http://www.christiangallery.com/
atrocity (exhorting followers to "Starve Satan: Stop Abortion").
150 Id.
.' See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life
Activists, 244 F.3d 1007, 2001 WL 293260 (9th Cir. Mar. 28, 2001); Rene Sanchez,
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The Nuremburg Files web site lists several law enforcement officers by name,
referring to them as "LAW ENFORCEMENT: their [abortion providers']
bloodhounds."' Although the Nuremburg Files web site claims that its lists are
being compiled as evidence for an anticipated "crimes against humanity" trial of
reproductive health care workers and anyone assisting them,' the main "feature"
of the website is that names of listed people receive a strike-through whenever they
are killed.' Many reproductive health care workers are expecting a resurgence of
violence now that the Ninth Circuit has allowed the Nuremburg Files to continue
publishing its lists.' The fact that heavily armed political extremists are actively
identifying and targeting law enforcement officers and members of the public as
enemies in their "holy war" is one example of a continuing public safety need for
SWAT training and tactics.
E. Racist Ideologues
Xenophobia and prejudice have existed in the U.S. in one form or another since
its colonial days. 56 Present day manifestations of this sociological event include
gangs, political groups, and religious organizations bent on promoting the
superiority of their ethnic group above others.'" Racist messages are disseminated
by these groups to a wide audience through emerging Internet technology and "hate
rock."'58 Violence by these factions unfortunately is not uncommon, 9 and the
Antiabortion Web Site Handed A Win; Court Says Threatening Content on Doctors is
Protected Free Speech, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2001, at AO1.
' See Nuremburg Files, Alleged Abortionists & Their Accomplices, at http://www.
christiangallery.com/atrocity/aborts.htmil.
'5 See Nuremburg Files, The Nuremburg Files, supra note 149.
'' See Nuremburg Files, Alleged Abortionists & Their Accomplices, supra note 152
(including the names of one Alabama law enforcement officer and one retired U.S. Air
Force Lieutenant Colonel killed in abortion clinic violence).
' See Weinstein, supra note 145, at Al ("This decision is clearly a green light to the
most violent and radical anti-abortion fanatics in the country that they can get away with it
and not worry.") (quoting a Boulder, Colorado doctor). The National Abortion Federation
website reports that there were 2,540 violent incidents against reproductive health care
facilities and their workers since 1977, including murders, attempted murders, assaults, acid
attacks, and bombings. See National Abortion Federation, Incidents of Violence and
Disruption Against Abortion Providers, at http://www.prochoice.org/default7.htm. Seven
murders and seventeen attempted murders related to anti-abortion activities have taken place
within the last ten years. See id
116 See CATHERINE McNICOL STOCK, RURAL RADIcALS 45 (1996) ("[ 18th Century Trans-
Appalachian] [s]ettlers ardently believed... in their racial superiority to native peoples.").
157 See Greg Barrett, Fear, Pride, Cynicism: The Building Blocks for a Society of Hate,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Jul. 19, 1999, at Al, available at 1999 WL 3370554.
118 The Internet: Downloading Hate, ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1999, available at 1999 WL
29811474 (describing Internet hate sites); Mariyam Joyce-Hasham, Web Offense, WORLD
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recent linkage of racism and religious doctrine by groups such as the World Church
of the Creator and the Nation of Yahweh makes them extremely dangerous."O
Membership in these types of organizations is widespread and actually growing,
affecting communities across the country. 6 Many ofthese extremists are affiliated
with the militia/patriot movement, presenting an even more serious challenge to law
enforcement authorities.
62
F. The Militia/Patriot Movement
An emerging social phenomena in America has been the rise of private
TODAY, Mar. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 10833684 (same). The Anti-Defamation
League estimates that at least 1,600 racist Web sites exist. See The Anti-Defamation League
Homepage at http://www.adl.org.
The rise of the "hate rock" movement has been boosted by the purchase of the largest
American hate-rock record label by the author of The Turner Diaries, the fictional book
describing a "race war" in America where whites annihilate all other ethnic groups that was
the inspiration for Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh. See Kim Murphy, BehindAll
the Noise of Hate Music, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2000, at Al.
15 See DEES, supra note 6, at 142-44 (describing the mid-1980s rampage of the neo-Nazi
group "The Order," which left a string of armed robberies, murder, and counterfeiting,
including a $3.8 million dollar armored car robbery, before its leader was killed in a shootout
with the FBI). Of the money obtained through these robberies for the purpose of financing
racist activities, "[o]nly $600,000 of the nearly $4.3 million stolen in the robberies has ever
been recovered. Authorities believe... the remaining millions [were distributed] to a host
of white supremacist leaders, including [Aryan Nations 'official'] Louis Beam and [Aryan
Nations founder] Richard Butler." Id at 143. Beam was a Ku Klux Klan leader who
organized an armed mob to threaten Vietnamese-American fishermen in Texas from
competing with whites. Beam is currently involved in militia organizing within the white
supremacist movement.
" Two high profile mass shootings in 1999 involved individuals affiliated with or
connected to racist religions. See Nicholas Geranios, Police in US. Gearing Up for New
Year's Eve: Hate Group Eruption Feared, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 12, 1999, at A 12. One of
the individuals involved in the shooting sprees was also a former resident of the Aryan
Nations headquarters compound in Hayden Lake, Idaho. See Frank Gibney, Jr., The Kids
Got in the Way, TIME, Aug. 23, 1999, at 24. The World Church of the Creator is the latest
organized incarnation of the Christian Identity cult, which teaches that Northern Europeans
are the chosen people of God, while Jewish people are the descendants of Satan and non-
whites are "sub-human mud people." See Crocker Stephenson, Missionaries of Hate,
MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Mar. 19, 2000, at IL, available at 2000 WL 3839078.
161 See, e.g., Elaine Porterfield, 1-5 Corridor Now Has Most Hate Groups in Region,
SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 29, 2000, at B1, available at 2000 WL 5289701
(describing rise in hate groups in the geographic region between Portland, Oregon, and
Seattle, Washington); Joan Treadway, Race Lines Harden as Hate Groups' Membership
Rises, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 25, 2000, at B8, available at 2000 WL
6549679 (describing the increase in hate group membership).
162 See DEES, supra note 6, at 200, 202.
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paramilitary groups collectively known as "militias."' 63 One source asserts that the
movement may number between five and twelve million members.'" Militia groups
have been formed in urban as well as rural areas.'65 Militias are the latest
incarnation of American vigilante groups, which were typically organized to right
a perceived wrong or to prepare for an anticipated wrong.' Some of the reasons
given for forming or joining a militia include resistance to United Nations world
domination conspiracies, a perceived lack of federal and local government
accountability, opposition to environmentalism, opposition to taxation, vigilantism
and crime control, and racist and religious ideologies. 6 ' One unifying theme among
all militias is the belief that present American society is in need of social or political
reform in order to return to a "correct" operational existence, hence the concurrent
title of "patriot" movement.'" The existence of militias has even concerned the
U.S. Congress, which held hearings in 1994 to determine the extent and validity of
the threat to civil order posed by militia groups. 69 Though the majority of militias
are considered "defensive" or "reactionary" in nature,' the mentality evidenced by
163 See id at 199. Dees also states: "Between 1994 and 1996 there were at least 441
militia units across the country. Every state had at least one within its borders .... In
addition[,] . . .368 allied Patriot groups promoted the formation of militias, provided
information and materials to them, or espoused ideas ... that are common in militia circles."
Id. Dees adds that 137 of these groups had ties to the racist right. Id. at 200.
'" See RICHARD ABANES, AMERICAN MILITIAS 2 (1996) (citing Daniel Junas, Angry
White Guys with Guns: The Rise of the Militias, 52 COVERT ACTION QUARTERLY 21
(Spring 1995) and Jill Smolowe, Enemies of the State, TIME, May 8, 1995, at 61).
165 See Southern Poverty Law Center Homepage at http://www.splcenter.org; Edward
Levine, NYC Has Hatemongers, Too, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 22, 1999, at 28.
'66 See MCNICOLSTOCK, supra note 156, at 143-76 (describingthe modem militia/patriot
movement and comparing it to early rural American vigilantism).
167 See DEES, supra note 6, at 86-90; Allen D. Sapp, Richard D. Holden & Michael E.
Wiggins, Value & BeliefSystems of Right-Wing Extremists: Rationale and Motivation for
Bias-Motivated Crimes, in BIAS CRIME: AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT & LEGAL
RESPONSES 105-32 (Robert J. Kelly, ed. 1993).
'" See ABANES, supra note 164, at 2. Abanes states:
The glue binding [the militia/patriot movement] together is a noxious
compound of four ingredients: (1) an obsessive suspicion of the government;
(2) belief in anti-government conspiracy theories; (3) a deep-seated hatred of
government officials; and (4) afeeling that the United States Constitution,
for all intents and purposes, has been discarded by Washington [D. C.]
bureaucrats.
Id. (emphasis added).
' See DEES, supra note 6, at 86-90. These hearings were probably motivated more
because of the Oklahoma City bombing rather than the mere presence of militias in the U.S.
170 See PROJECT MEGGIDDO, supra note 142, at 22. ("Law enforcement should be aware
that the majority of militias are reactive as opposed to proactive."). Project Meggido was an
official FBI strategic assessment of the potential for violence in the U.S. associated with the
new millennium.
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the following statements, combined with the presence of massive amounts of
weaponry, indicates a continuing threat to law enforcemen"' "We will destroy
targets such as telephone relay centers, bridges, fuel storage tanks, communications
towers, radio stations, airports, et cetera .... Human targets will be engaged when
it is beneficial to the cause to eliminate particular individuals who oppose us like
troops,police, political figures, snitches, et cetera."'" "They called cops 'punks in
badges' and said the next time one of them was stopped, they'd shoot the cop."' 73
These statements reflect just one of the threats faced by local law enforcement
departments. The continuing threat of aspiring militia saboteurs, 4 and of
extremists sufficiently armed and emboldened enough to shoot down a police
helicopter, " indicates that the danger posed by these elements has not abated.
G. Foreign and Domestic Terrorists
Terrorist acts inside the continental U.S. are nothing new. During the period
from 1970-1998, there were 3,150 terrorist incidents in the U.S. attributable to
7 At least one militia group was arrested before it could carry out a millennial mischief
plan to blow up a California propane gas plant, underscoring the statement that not all
militias are "reactionary." See Lance Williams, FBI Says Arrests Broke Up Y2K Plot, S. F.
EXAMINER, Dec. 26, 1999, at Al.
New York City Police also recently raided the Queens apartment of a previously
convicted bomb-maker who was on probation, yielding an assault rifle with 300 rounds of
ammunition, a bomb making manual, and white supremacist materials. See Sean Gardiner
& Michael Arena, Cops: Arsenal in Man's Home, NEWSDAY, Mar. 31, 2000, at A6.
112 ABANES, supra note 164, at 26 (emphasis added). The statement was found on a
computer disk during a federal investigation of the Virginia based "Blue Ridge Hunt Club,"
charged with illegally stockpiling machine guns and planning to raid a National Guard
armory. See id at 26.
"' Statement by Gary Krause, Fowlerville, Michigan, police chief, after officers stopped
what had appeared to be a drunk driver. DEES, supra note 6, at 131. The car contained three
men with camouflage uniforms and face paint who identified themselves as Michigan Militia
members, along with three 9 mm pistols, a .357 magnum revolver, an AK-47, an M-1 rifle,
an M-14 rifle, 700 rounds of ammunition, three gas masks, night-vision equipment, and
notes indicating they were spying on local police departments. Id
"74 See, e.g., supra note 171; Ron Martz, Militia Member Faces Gun Charges, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., Dec. 11, 1999, at 4G (describing a Florida militia groups' millennial mischief
plan to destroy electrical transmission lines).
'7 See Michael Vigh, Idaho Pair Arrested After Tense Standoff and Gunfights in Death
Valley, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 25, 2000, at D5 (reporting the downing of a California
Highway Patrol helicopter by fugitive extremists using unidentified high-powered rifles).
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political or extremist groups based both inside the U.S. and overseas."" While
several of these incidents can be attributed to any of the aforementioned public
safety threats, many of these incidents were perpetrated by foreign nationals
attempting to further foreign political goals."' Some examples of these types of
incidents include Taiwanese radical attacks on People's Republic of China
officials,' the 1980 and 1982 assassinations of two Turkish Consuls General, 79
over sixteen terrorist acts by Sikh separatists including murders, kidnapping, and
bombings,'8 0 a 1994 machine gun attack on Jewish students in Manhattan by a
Lebanese cabdriver,' and the 1997 New York City Police Department raid of a
Palestinian bomb-making factory in Brooklyn.'
According to Louis Mizell, Jr., a former Special Agent and Intelligence Officer
with the U.S. State Department Diplomatic Security Section, many terrorist
incidents that occur in the U.S. are attributed to ordinary crime pattems, thus hiding
the true amount of terrorist activity in the country.' 3 American law enforcement
is thus caught smack in the middle of this situation because they are the primary
method of crime control in this country. For example, at least eighty-eight domestic
and international terrorists were encountered by police making routine traffic stops
between 1977 and 1997, resulting in sixteen killed or wounded officers. 8 The
potential for violent encounters with such individuals makes SWAT training and
deployment essential for public safety.
VI. LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON POLICE CONDUCT
A. An Introduction
SWAT teams in service throughout the country are subject to the existing
constitutional constraints imposed on law enforcement. These restraints are
116 See Louis MIZELL, JR., TARGET USA: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE NEW TERRORIST
WAR 179 (1998). Mizell also includes short descriptions of selected incidents, including
assassinations, bombings, kidnappings, sabotage, attacks on police, hostage incidents,
bank/armored car robberies, and armory raids. Id at 179-200.
'7 See id.
11 See id at 179.
179 See id at 183.
110 See id. at 188.
'' See id. at 194.
182 See id. at 198.
"3 See id. at 12. Mizell states that at least one street gang has worked as paid mercenaries
for a foreign government. See id. at 25 (describing the connection between Chicago's
Blackstone Rangers a.k.a. El Rukn and the Libyan government of Moammar Qaddaffi). This
link inevitably leads to interesting conclusions about the sources of arms and money used
by American gangs.
114 See id at 145.
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typically those articulated by the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable search
and/or seizure of one's "persons, houses, papers, and effects;"'8 the Fifth
Amendment prohibits compelling the accused to make incriminating statements
against himself; and the Fourteenth Amendment makes these restraints applicable
to the state governments.8 6 Of these, the Fourth Amendment is the constraint most
applicable to the SWAT mission." 7
The Fourth Amendment protections conferred on U.S. residents prohibit
"unreasonable" police conduct during the course of searches and seizures of people
and property.' The Fourth Amendment's warrant clause adds additional
protection from government intrusion by requiring a showing of "probable cause"
to justify a belief that either the warrant target has committed a crime'" or that
evidence of a crime will be found in a certain place,'" before judicial approval of
a search or arrest warrant is given.'9' The Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment helps illustrate the boundaries of these protections.
B. Searches
The Supreme Court has ruled that police may not search people or property
unless certain conditions have been met. These conditions can be divided into those
requiring "reasonable suspicion" and those requiring "probable cause.""g
1. Searches based on reasonable suspicion
Reasonable suspicion is a "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting
a person of criminal activity. It is a "less demanding standard than probable cause":
"reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quality
or content than that required to establish probable cause, . . . (and) reasonable
suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show
's U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
'6 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V, & XIV.
18' The Supreme Court has stated that Fourth Amendment "reasonableness standard," and
not substantive due process analysis, should be utilized when examining police use of force
during "the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure."' Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
188 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
189 See Kathryn R. Urbonya, Selected Fourth Amendment Issues in Section 1983
Litigation, 596 PLI/Lit 65, 75-76 (1998) [hereinafter Urbonya (Issues)].
19o See id. at 75.
'9' See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
,9 See Urbonya (Issues), supra note 189, at 74-78.
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probable cause. '' 93
The Supreme Court first articulated the reasonable suspicion standard in the
case of Terry v. Ohio. ' Terry held that police may stop a person if they have an
articulable basis for suspecting that the person has or is about to commit a crime.'95
Reasonable suspicion is not enough basis for an arrest, but it is enough for the
police to stop and briefly detain the person.'" After stopping the person, the police
may make a limited frisk of the person for weapons if they have a further reasonable
suspicion that the person is armed and presently dangerous.'"g The reasonable
suspicion for the stop is independent from the reasonable suspicion for the frisk.'9"
Probable cause is a higher standard of suspicion that must be shown before an arrest
or more invasive search is carried out.
2. Searches based on probable cause
The Supreme Court has defined a "search" as occurring when "an act violate(s)
the privacy upon which (one) justifiably relie(s)."' 9 This privacy finding is based
on a bifurcated analysis: "[F]irst, that a person have [sic] exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."2'0 The Supreme Court has assured
the respect of this expectation of privacy by interpreting the Fourth Amendment as
requiring a warrant to be issued before most searches may take place.2"'
"' Id. at 77 (citing Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-6 (1996); Alabama v.
White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).
194 392 U.S. 1 (1976).
195 See id.
1% See id.
197 See Urbonya (Issues), supra note 189, at 78.
m See id. at 78.
I d. at 71-72 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)).
200 Id. at 72 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
20 Six exceptions have been made to the warrant requirement, but each requires either
consent or the presence of some level of articulable suspicion to search. The exceptions are:
search of a suspect's general area during a lawful arrest (United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1973)); search of automobiles (Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925));
objects in plain view (Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990)); consent of the searched
(Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)); a stop-and-frisk search based on
reasonable suspicion (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)); and when exigent circumstances
either render the warrant procurement process impractical due to the danger to the public
(Warden v. Hayes, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)) or may allow the destruction of evidence to take
place (Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)).
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a. Search warrants
A search warrant is a pre-authorized judicial authorization to conduct a search.
Once a warrant is required, it must be issued before a search takes place in order for
the search to be legally valid. 202 To obtain a warrant, the requesting officer must
explain to the judge or magistrate both the particular description of the place to be
searched2 3 and the particular description 6f the things to be seized,2 °6 and must also
persuade the judge or magistrate that probable cause exists.2 5 The judge or
magistrate will issue the warrant if he/she is satisfied that these elements have
been met.
C. Seizures
The Supreme Court has defined the seizure of property as "some meaningful
interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property.""0 6 Seizure
of a person was held to generally occur in three different ways:
1. Whether the officer, by means of a physical force or show of
authority has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.
2. Whether a reasonable person would have believed that he was not
free to leave, and the person in fact submitted to the assertion of
authority.
3. Whether there was a governmental termination of freedom of
movement through means intentionally applied.
These definitions focus on the assertion of authority and the use of
physical force. 0
Seizures were also found to occur when deadly force is used to apprehend a
suspect.2 '6 Seizures of people can be either brief stops for questioning or actual
202 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
203 See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987).
204 See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
205 See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965).
206 Urbonya (Issues), supra note 189, at 74 (quoting Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56,
61 (1992) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984))).
207 Urbonya (Issues), supra note 189, at 72-73 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16
(1976) (liberty restrained); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,554 (1980) (Stewart,
J.) (believed to be not free to leave); I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,215 (1984) (same);
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991) (submission to authority); Brower v.
County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (government intent required)).
20. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
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arrests. 9 Seizure of a person by a brief stop may occur on the basis of reasonable,
suspicion alone.211 A full-blown arrest may only be based on probable cause, with
or without an arrest warrant if the arrest takes place in a public place,2"' or
(generally) with a warrant if the arrest is at the suspect's home.212 A brief detention
is also acceptable when the person detained is present during a police search of a
premises when the search is conducted under the authority of a search warrant. t 3
1. Stopping a person based on reasonable suspicion
Police may detain briefly a person for questioning if they have reasonable
suspicion that the suspect is "engag[ing] in criminal activity,"214 or that the
individual "was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony. 2t
2. Arrests based on probable cause
a. Arrest without an arrest warrant
An arrest is the "taking of a person into [extended] custody [for the purpose of
officially] charg[ing them] with a crime." 6 Police may arrest a person in public
without a warrant2 ' when certain conditions have been met. "A police officer has
probable cause to arrest when 'the facts and circumstances within his knowledge
and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a
prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed or was committing an
offense."'' This standard allows such an arrest, supported by probable cause, to
take place as long as it happens in a public area. This level of protection has been
extended further by the Supreme Court's decision in Payton v. New York, regarding
the need for arrest warrants if the arrest takes place in the suspect's home.219
209 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
210 See id.
2,1 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976).
22 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980).
113 See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981).
214 Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331 (1990).
2 5 United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985).
216 JOSEPH G. COOK & PAUL MARCUS, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3 (4th ed. 1997).
217 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
218 Urbonya (Issues), supra note 189, at 75-76 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91
(1964)).
219 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
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b. Arrests with an arrest warrant
The Court in Payton held that police generally need to secure an arrest warrant
before entering a suspect's home to arrest him/her."0 No search warrant is needed
if the home to be entered is the suspect's,22 but the Supreme Court has held that
entry into a third party's home to execute an arrest warrant will first require a search
warrant to be issued. 2 Exceptions to this general rule exist and are discussed later
in this Note.
In addition to the foundational requirements needed before a search or seizure
may take place, the Supreme Court has placed further restraints on how the police
carry out these searches and seizures.
D. Manner of Searching and Seizing
The Fourth Amendment stipulates that Americans shall have the right to be free
from "unreasonable" searches and seizures."l The Supreme Court has applied this
principle to police conduct during the execution of searches and seizures and has
arrived at a fairly murky set of standards with which to judge police actions.
1. "Reasonableness"
Courts have the authority to examine the reasonableness of the level of force
used to arrest an individual,"4 including the use of deadly force,' as well as the
actions taken to execute a search warrant.' The police conduct at issue is not
subject to a rigid standard of reasonableness. 7  Under Graham v. Connor,
"[d]etermining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is 'reasonable'
under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of'the nature and quality
of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' against the
210 See id. at 576.
221 See id.
See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981).
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
224 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) ("A seizure triggering the
Fourth Amendment's protections occurs ... when government actors have.., in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen.").
22 See Maravilla v. United States, 60 F.3d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Under the Fourth
Amendment the inquiry is whether the officer's decision to use deadly force was objectively
reasonable.") (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97).
2 6 See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979).
227 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 ("The test of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.") (quoting Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 529 (1979)).
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countervailing governmental interests at stake." '28 "The 'reasonableness' inquiry
in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers'
actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting them. '29 Thus, the Fourth Amendment's "proper application requires
careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case. "230 These
facts to be considered "includ[e] the severity of the crime at issue, whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight. 231
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment restraints on the
use of deadly force are especially important to police. Supreme Court rulings on
deadly force have held that
where an officer has probable cause to believe that a person poses a
threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or others, or where
an officer has been threatened with a weapon, it is not constitutionally
unreasonable to use deadly force where necessary to prevent the person
from harming others.232
This holding gives clear standards for when deadly force may be utilized by police,
ensuring the proper application of such police authority.
The Supreme Court has clarified Fourth Amendment analysis methodology by
stating in Whren v. United States233 that, if probable cause existed, courts would
only engage in a Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" balancing analysis if
"extraordinary circumstances" were also present.234 These circumstances were
identified as "seizure by deadly force, unannounced entry into a home, entry into
a home without a warrant, and physical penetration of the body."" 5 The Supreme
Court has also clarified the Fourth Amendment restraints on the types ofwarrantless
"2 Id at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (quoting United States
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983))).
229 Id. at 397.
230 Id at 396.
231 ld
232 Williams, 804 F. Supp. at 1570 n.5 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11
(1985)).
23 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
234 See Kathryn R. Urbonya, Fourth Amendment Issues in Section 1983 Litigation, 15
TouRo L. REv. 1623, 1624 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 817) [hereinafter Urbonya (4th
Amend)].
23 Whren, 517 U.S. at 818 (citations omitted). The effect of this ruling is that courts will
give deference to police actions not falling within one of the "extraordinary areas" because
"the presence of probable cause itself generally signifies that the challenged [police] action
was reasonable." Urbonya (4th Amend.), supra note 234, at 1624.
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and unannounced entries commonly justified under the "exigent circumstances"
principle.
2. Exigent Circumstances
Warrantless and unannounced police entries into private homes have been
frowned upon by American jurisprudence since before the Bill of Rights even
existed.236 Even so, Supreme Court rulings on the issue have carved out a definitive
set of standards which allow them to occur.
a. The Knock and Announce Rule
The Supreme Court, through the trilogy of Wilson v. Arkansas,37 Richards v.
Wisconsin," and United States v. Ramirez,"9 has defined the scope of the Fourth
Amendment's "knock and announce" doctrine.24 In Wilson, the Court stated that
the Fourth Amendment had incorporated the common law rule that police must
knock and announce their presence and purpose before entering a home to execute
a search or arrest warrant.24 The Richards' ruling held that states could not
legislate a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement.242 Ramirez
involved the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3109, a federal statute that codified the
knock-and-announce requirement and is applicable to federal law enforcement
officers.4 3 Each of these knock-and-announce cases held that the rule had an
"exigent circumstances" exception that would allow police to bypass knocking and
enter a home unannounced.
b. The exigent circumstances exception
The exigent circumstance exception is probably one of the more controversial
legal principles of Fourth Amendment law. The general principle allows entry
without knocking or announcing if "the police... have reasonable suspicion that
knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would
be dangerous [to their or others' safety] or futile, or that it would inhibit the
236 See G. Robert Blakey, The Rule ofAnnouncement and Unlawful Entry, 112 U. PA. L.
REv. 499 (1964).
237 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
238 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
29 523 U.S. 65 (1998).
240 See Urbonya (4th Amend), supra note 234, at 1636.
21 See id. at 1637 (citing Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934-35),
242 See Richards, 520 U.S. at 388.
243 See 18 U.S.C. § 3109; Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958) (noting that
§ 3109 "codifi[ed] a tradition embedded in Anglo-American law").
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effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of
evidence."2" "The most common applications of the exception are where the
officers believe they may be in danger because the defendant possesses a firearm,
where there is a likelihood that the defendant may escape, or where it is likely that
evidence may be destroyed before it can be recovered."245
Richards v. Wisconsin added another twist to the exigent circumstances
exception by approving the practice of, and clarifying the standard for, police
obtaining warrants pre-approving no-knock entries. The Court stated that "[t]he
practice of allowing magistrates to issue no-knock warrants [is] entirely reasonable
when sufficient cause to do so can be demonstrated ahead of time." '246 This means
that as long as police can convince a magistrate of the reasonable suspicion that
exigent circumstances will exist at the time of arrest, they may get judicial
authorization to conduct a no-knock entry. Richards also stated that if the
magistrate refuses to grant the no-knock provisions of the warrant, the police are not
precluded from declaring exigent circumstances exist at the scene and conducting
a lawful no-knock entry aiyway.47
Another aspect of the no-knock entries is the question of "whether the[ir]
lawfulness . . depends on whether property is damaged in the course of the
entry."2" The Court in Ramirez v. United States stated that "[e]xcessive or
unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth
Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search are
not subject to suppression." '249 The Court held that as long as the Richards exigent
circumstances standards25 for justifying a no-knock entry were met, resulting
property damage would only be scrutinized under the Fourth Amendment "objective
reasonableness" standard.25 '
244 Richards, 520 U.S. at 394. Included under the exigent circumstances umbrella is the
"hot pursuit" doctrine, which allows police to pursue suspects into their homes without a
search warrant as long as there is an "immediate and continuous pursuit." See Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984).
245 Edward X. Clinton, Jr., "Open Up! It's the Police!," CrJM. JUST., Spring 1997, at
18,21.
246 Richards, 520 U.S. at 396 n.7 (emphasis added).
247 See id. ('[A] magistrate's decision not to authorize a no-knock entry should not be
interpreted to remove the officer's authority to exercise independent judgment concerning
the wisdom of a no-knock entry at the time the warrant is being executed."); Urbonya (4th
Amend.), supra note 234, at 1638. The police actions are still subject to court review after
the fact, if challenged.
248 Ramirez v. United States, 523 U.S. 65, 70 (1998).
249 Id. at71.
250 See text accompanying note 248.
251 See Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 71-72 ("As for the manner in which entry was accomplished
. their conduct was clearly reasonable." Id. at 72.).
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D. Summary of Legal Restraints on Police Conduct
The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence has given police much
leeway in the execution of their duties by promulgating the "objective
reasonableness standard" as the Fourth Amendment test. What this standard
emphasizes is that the actions of the police must be reviewed according to the
particular facts and circumstances of each case. Such a standard is fair and
workable, and allows SWAT teams to utilize their training as circumstances dictate
in order to resolve the situation facing them as quickly and safely as possible.
V. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF SWAT TEAM ACTIVITY
By their nature, SWAT teams tread a thin line between reasonable and illegal
police conduct. 2 The Fourth Amendment requires that the actions of police be
reasonable, especially in cases utilizing deadly force or no-knock entries." 3 SWAT
training with the Department of Defense teaches SWAT teams how to perform
actions that may be perceived to be outside the "reasonableness" boundary of ihe
Fourth Amendment." 4
A. SWAT Warrant Service Utilizing DOD Training
The most controversial aspect of SWAT team deployment is their increasingly
primary duty of executing search and arrest warrants."5 SWAT teams trained in
special operations-developed tactical entry methods are at the edge of the Fourth
Amendment." 6 Courts are required to give their decisions some level of deference
252 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (stating that force likely to cause death
or serious injury is subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny); text accompanying notes 65-86
(describing SWAT tactics, including explosive-assisted building entries and specialized
firearms training).
253 See text accompanying notes 185-251.
2"4 See, e.g., Weber, supra note 9, at 3 (criticizing this training as having "threaten[ed]
civil liberties[] [and] constitutional norms").
255 See Booth, supra note 8, at Al ("Between 1980 and 1995, for example, [Peter] Kraska
found that SWAT units were employed in their traditional roles only for a minority of call-
outs ... [blut 75 percent of their mission is now devoted to serving high-risk warrants,
mostly drug raids.").
The hostility to SWAT teams generally has been justified by criticism of the FBI
Hostage Rescue Team's actions at Waco. See KOPEL & BLACKMAN, supra note 7 (literally
making a "federal case" out of the Waco incident (no pun intended)); Weber, supra note 9,
at 10 (bemoaning "the loss of innocent life at Waco" as an example of the danger of having
SWAT teams).
256 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989) ("The calculus of [Fourth
Amendment] reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are
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since "[t]he 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision
of hindsight."2"
SWAT entry methods such as using tow trucks to remove doors, the use of
flash-bangs, no-knock "dynamic entries," explosive-assisted entries, and hastened
entries after knocking have all been challenged under the Fourth Amendment as
being unreasonable."8 The majority of these cases have found that the challenged
actions have met the "objective reasonableness" standard, despite the extremity of
the police conduct.2"
B. Measuring "Reasonable" Entry Standards
The Fourth Amendment requires an objective balancing of all facts when
determining if the police actions are constitutionally reasonable." This indicates
that as long as the "totality of circumstances" test is used to decide the
reasonableness of a SWAT team's actions, such actions will continue to be found
constitutional as long as they can be justified by the courts as reasonable under the
circumstances. For example, the Third Circuit refused to find an "unreasonable"
seizure where a SWAT team forced home occupants to lie face down in dirt outside
their home at gunpoint, while continuously cursing at them for several minutes,
often forced to make split-secondj udgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and
rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.").
SWAT teams are utilized specifically to deal with these sorts of situations facing police
departments.
257 Id. at 396.
258 See United States v. Dice, No. 98-3092, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 74 (6th Cir. Jan. 6,
2000) (no-knock entry); United States v. Spikes, 158 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 1998) (hasty timing
between knocking and entering); Tracas v. Denney, No. 96-16769, 1997 U.S. App. WL
730271 (9th Cir. Nov. 24, 1997) (no-knock entry); United States v. Hawkins, 102 F.3d 973
(8th Cir. 1996) (no-knock entry); Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988 (10th Cir. 1996) (no-knock
entry, severely criticized in concurring opinion); United States v. Carter, 999 F.2d 182 (7th
Cir. 1993) (no-knock warrant, but knock without announcement at entry); United States v.
Kingsley, No. 97-40095-01-RDR 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8310 (D. Kan. May 21, 1998)
(flash-bangs); United States v. Simpson, No. CRIM.A.95-524-02, 1997 U.S. Dist. WL
56923, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 1997) (tow truck use); United States v. Myers, No.94-
20013-01-EEO, 1994 U.S. Dist. WL 324582 at *10 (D. Kan. June 15, 1994) (flash-bangs);
Bates v. City of Fort Wayne, Indiana, 591 F. Supp. 711 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (use of explosives
to breach steel door).
259 See id. The Tenth Circuit concurring opinion in Jenkins v. Wood suggested that the
§ 1983 plaintiffs pursue state tort action due to the "egregious.. . commando approach"
taken by police. Jenkins, 81 F.3d at 996-977 (Henry, Circuit J., concurring). Otherwise, the
plaintiffs were unable to prevail due to the fact they could not identify the actual SWAT
team members involved. Id. at 995-96.
260 See Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 396-99 (1989).
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during the course of a warrantless domestic violence arrest, because the court was
"reluctant to establish a precedent that would subject every police arrest of a group
of possible violent offenders to compliance with Marquis of Queensberry Rules of
fair play."26 In another example, one court used rational basis scrutiny to reject the
assertion that the mere deployment of a SWAT team was unreasonable.262 These
decisions illustrate that Fourth Amendment analysis tends to favor police decision-
making in highly stressful, rapidly evolving situations. While this may be
considered a positive legal principle from the perspective of law enforcement, valid
policy arguments maybe made against such police practices.2 3 Among these policy
arguments is the heightened risk of a constitutional violation actually occurring.'
C. Redressing Constitutional Violations by SWA T Teams
Though the "objective reasonableness" standard validates many SWAT actions,
not all have been able to meet that requirement. A constitutional violation may
mean huge damages levied against officers and the municipality for which they
work, or the exclusion of crucial evidence, allowing violent criminals to be released
from the criminal justice process. In one example, the farm city of Dinuba,
California, reportedly lost a $12.5 million wrongful death suit brought by the family
of a sixty-four year-old man who was killed by SWAT team members during the
course of a no-knock raid. 63 Other less spectacular rulings deal with evidentiary
suppression'" or § 1983 litigation.2 7 Some disturbing trends evidenced in the
261 Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997).
262 See Williams v. Richmond County, 804F. Supp. 1561, 1569-70 (S.D. Ga. 1992),aff'd,
19 F.3d 36 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 818 (1994) (distinguishing between
constitutional violations and "ordinary errors of judgment"). The district court based this
decision on the Supreme Court ruling in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), in which
prison officials' decision to shoot at inmates during a prison riot hostage rescue attempt was
found not to violate a wounded prisoner's Eight Amendment rights as long as the officials
had not acted with "obduracy and wantonness." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319, 322-26.
263 See Peter B. Kraska & Victor Kappeler, Militarizing American Police: The Rise and
Normalization of Paramilitary Units, 44 SOC. PROBS. 1 (1997) (arguing that the rise in
SWAT teams is a symptom of an erroneous approach to effective policing strategy); Diane
C. Weber, Are SWAT Teams Paramilitary?, WORLD & I, Jan. 1, 2000, at 78 available at
2000 WL 9050671 [hereinafter Weber (Paramilitary)] (asking whether "machine guns and
flash-bang grenades have a place in civil society"); Weber, supra note 9.
264 See Weber (Paramilitary), supra note 263 (describing several tragic incidents arguably
precipitated by aggressive SWAT team actions).
265 See Mark Arax, Small Farm Town's SWAT Team Leaves Costly Legacy, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 1999, at Al available at 1999 WL 2145825. Though the litigation in this case was
reported to have taken place in the Fresno, California, Federal District Court, there appears
to be no record of a jury verdict or court opinion.
266 See United States v. Dice, No. 98-3092, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 74 (6th Cir. Jan. 6,
2000) (no-knock entry was unreasonable); United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444 (10th Cir.
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caselaw indicate that § 1983 principles may hinder plaintiffs' attempts to redress
wrongs committed by SWAT units.
1. § 1983 issues
"42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for persons whose rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United have
been deprived 'under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State." 2  Though this statute sounds as though it allows effective redress,
the Supreme Court has carved out the affirmative defense of "qualified immunity"
which "provides police officers with immunity from paying damage awards if they
did not violate 'clearly established' constitutional law 'of which a reasonable person
should have known."' 69 As one court plainly stated, "[o]ur society does not want
its police officers to worry about potential litigation; it wants them to concentrate
on maintaining law and order in our cities and towns."27
a. "Qualified immunity"
Qualified immunity involves a two-part analysis: "(1) Has the plaintiff stated
a violation of a constitutional right? and (2) If so, was that right clearly established,
that is, were the 'contours of the right sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand what he (or she) is doing violates that right?"'27 "If reasonable
minds would differ as to whether the official's conduct was clearly illegal, then
immunity should attach."2
The first step of stating a constitutional violation may sound easy, but is not in
1989) cert denied, 498 U.S. 1104 (1991) (finding that SWAT team's order, from outside a
house, for occupants to leave house at gunpoint was in effect a warrantless nonconsensual
search of premises for a suspect); United States v. Curzi, 867 F.2d 36 (1 st Cir. 1989) (same);
United States v. Dupras, 980 F. Supp. 344 (D. Mont. 1997) (insufficient evidence to justify
no-knock entry).
267 Alexander v. City & County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
deniedsub nom. Lennon v. Alexander, 513 U.S. 1083 (1995) (SWAT entry without an arrest
warrant, despite having an administrative plumbing inspection warrant, was unreasonable
due to the attempted arrest being the actual purpose for entering).
268 Williams v. Richmond County, 804 F. Supp. 1561, 1565 (S.D. Ga. 1992), affd, 19
F.3d 36 (1 th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 818 (1994) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
' Urbonya (Issues), supra note 189, at 101 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
812 (1982)).
2 0 Liebenstein v. Crowe, 826 F. Supp. 1174, 1184 (E.D. Wisc. 1992) (granting summary
judgment).
271 Urbonya (Issues), supra note 189, at 101 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640 (1987)).
272 Liebenstein, 826 F. Supp. at 1 184 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
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light of the "objective reasonableness" standard. A plaintiff must state what
constitutional violation has taken place.273 The second step of the analysis is much
harder, though especially important in the context of evaluating SWAT tactics
learned from the Department of Defense. All that is required for qualified immunity
on this second prong is the raising of a "legitimate question" as to the legality of the
conduct. 4 This low threshold has been met in numerous cases on precisely this
question of "arguable legality." 75 Due to the recent acquisition of DOD training276
there is a lack of legal authority defining the Fourth Amendment's control of the use
of such tactics. The result is the predictable granting of qualified immunity, as
lower courts have already done.2"
b. The "personally engage" requirement
Another important factor in § 1983 SWAT litigation concerns the requirement
that the plaintiff show that the defendant personally engaged in the alleged
violation.7 Critics have documented thoroughly the practice of SWAT members
273 See Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339 (11 th Cir. 1999) (finding that plaintiff failed to
state a violation of a constitutional right); Williams, 804 F. Supp. at 1569-71 (finding no
constitutional violation, therefore analysis ends).
274 Urbonya (Issues), supra note 189, at 103.
275 One disturbing case where the defendants prevailed under qualified immunity involved
the Philadelphia police department's aerial bombing of a home, resulting in massive property
damage when the whole block burned down. See In re City of Philadelphia Litig., 49 F.3d
945 (3rd Cir. 1995) (plurality opinion), cert. denied 516 U.S. 863 (1995). For another
example, see Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3rd Cir. 1997):
While the language and method used to effect the arrests appear to be more akin
to the Rambo-type behavior associated with police in overdramatized B movies
or TV shows than the police conduct ordinarily expected in a quiet, family
seaside town, we are reluctant to establish a precedent that would subject every
police arrest of a group of possible violent offenders to compliance with
Marquis of Queensberry Rules of fair play.
In one strange case, a sheriff was granted qualified immunity after being sued for not using
a SWAT team. See Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1992).
276 See supra text accompanying notes 118-25 (describing the recent growth of such
training in only the past ten years).
27 See supra note 256 (citing only one federal district court case addressing the issue of
explosive-assisted entries in the past twenty years). One case involving the shooting death
of a hostage taker explicitly used this second prong to reason that a lack of jurisprudence,
namely lawsuits brought by dead hostage-takers concerning "unreasonable" deadly force,
was enough to find qualified immunity for the officers. See Malignaggi v. County of
Gloucester, 855 F. Supp. 74, 79-81 (D.N.J. 1994).
278 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988 (10th Cir. 1996) (dismissing § 1983 suit
against SWAT supervisors on this very issue). "Team liability" is barred under this principle.
See Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1996).
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concealing their identities with masks, goggles, or balaclavas.279 Court opinions
also mention the wearing of masks by SWAT members.2 The result of this use of
masks is that injured parties cannot identify the persons "personally engaging" in
the violation of their constitutional rights.2 ' Critics of SWAT teams are quick to
pick up on this fact: "[Masks] prevent identification of rogue officers so that they
cannot be sued later for criminal acts."2 2 The apparent justification for the masks
is the psychological intimidation of suspects.8 If this is the only rationale, a policy
argument concerning the ability of wrongly treated citizens to seek redress through
§ 1983 litigation seems a compelling justification for doing away with the use of
masks. Not only would this allow the proper identification of guilty parties, but it
would help the public image of SWAT members.2
c. Municipal liability under § 1983: "policy or custom"
To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must be able to show
that the alleged constitutional violation was the result of an official policy orcustom
279 See Weber (Paramilitary), supra note 263 (describing teams as wearing "ninja
hoods"); KOPEL & BLACKMAN, supra note 7, at 344 ("Law enforcement use of masks in the
service of search or arrest warrants should be prohibited, except when specifically
authorized by a court when granting the warrant, based on compelling [governmental
interests].").
280 See Swint v. City of Wadley, 51 F.3d 988, 993 (11 th Cir. 1995) ("[Alt least some of
the [SWAT] members wore ski masks to conceal their identities."); Renalde v. County of
Denver, 807 F. Supp. 668,670 (D. Colo. 1992) ("The SWAT team [was] wearing masks and
wielding submachine guns .... ).
The inference in Jenkins is that the SWAT team was wearing masks: "The defense
[case] rests on the fact that neither [plaintiff] could identify the officer or officers
responsible for the egregious conduct that occurred in their home in the middle of the night."
Jenkins, 81 F.3d at 996 (Henry, J., concurring).
281 See Jenkins, 81 F.3d at 994-96.
282 KOPEL & BLACKMAN, supra note 7, at 344.
283 See Amy Joi Bryson, SWAT.- Highly Trained Teams Ready For Any Situation,
DESERET NEWS, Apr. 25, 1999, at A 1, available at 1999 WL 15642329 ("When they see the
SWAT team moving around in camouflage, carrying automatics and guns that may be
superior to [theirs], we found it was much easier to negotiate someone out of a tense
situation.") (quoting Weber County, Utah, Sheriff's Chief Deputy A.K. Greenwood).
284 See KOPEL & BLACKMAN, supra note 7, at 344 ("Masks ... make peace officers look
inappropriately terrifying .... ").
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of the municipality."' "The plaintiff must also demonstrate that there is a direct
causal link between the municipal policy [or custom] and the constitutional
deprivation." '
i. Municipal "policy"
A municipal policy may be shown in three ways: a decision maker's deliberate
choice, made among various alternatives; actions of a decision maker possessing
final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the complained action
(not including the discretionary actions of low-level officials); or by the showing
of a failure to take official action in some area, such as providing adequate police
training."8 7 A city's failure to provide adequate training can only be such a "policy"
if that failure
[E]vidences a "deliberate indifference" to the rights of persons whom the
police come in contact .... It may happen that... the need for enhanced
training is so obvious, and the inadequacy of training is so likely to
result in the violation of constitutional rights, that a jury could
reasonably attribute to the policymakers a deliberate indifference to
those training needs. In such a case, the failure to offer proper training
constitutes a policy for which a city is liable when improper training
actually imposes injury. "
But, "a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose
liability unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing,
(unconstitutional municipal policy)... attributed to a (municipal policymaker)." '289
The Supreme Court has defined "policymaker" as the "final policymaker[s]... for
the local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue."2 This question
may be a matter of state law, especially law enforcement powers delegated under
state constitutions. For example, in McMillan v. Monroe Count 9' the Supreme
285 See Tapia v. City of Greenwood, 965 F.2d 336, 338 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Pembaur
v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986)). Although the Supreme Court has clearly
defined the "policy" aspect, it has not addressed the "custom" aspect of municipal liability.
See Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering "Custom" in § 1983
MunicipalLiability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17,49 (2000)(claiming that § 1983 "custom" scrutiny
has been "forgotten" by the Supreme Court).
286 Tapia, 965 F.2d at 338 (citing Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)).
287 See Gilles, supra note 285, at 35-37, 41-47.
288 Tapia, 965 F.2d at 338-39 (citations omitted).
289 Id. at 339-40 (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985)).
290 McMillan v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997).
291 Yj
2001]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Court held that a county sheriff was not a § 1983 policymaker for purposes of
municipal liability because Alabama law dictated that law enforcement authority
was vested at the state level, and not the county level. 9 In another, a plaintiff's
claims were dismissed when she was able to "cite neither facts nor law showing that
a San Francisco [SWAT] commander is an authorized decision maker for the City
and County of San Francisco."' 3
This "policy" standard allows municipalities to immunize themselves from
§ 1983 liability by ensuring that they have some sort of constitutionally-sound basic
training program, regardless of whether officers adhere to it during a certain
operation."9' Because SWAT officers are typically drawn from the rank-and-file of
the police force, 9 "no distinction should be drawn between basic law enforcement
training and SWAT Team training with regard to ... procedures [common to both
duties, such as executing search warrants]."' The predicted result of SWAT
litigation under this standard is that municipalities will prevail as a matter of law
concerning the use of DOD-trained tactics because their "official" policy will be
shown to be constitutionally sound. For plaintiffs, this leaves pleading a "custom"
as a basis for municipal liability.
ii. Municipal "custom"
The issue of pleading a § 1983 "custom" in terms of an unwritten policy of
SWAT teams using unconstitutional methods learned from the DOD is an open-
ended question 97 To show custom, a plaintiff must "be able to prove the existence
of a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express
municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or
usage' with the force of law."' Just what evidence is required to have such a
292 See id. at 786-96.
293 Alexander v. City & County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1368 (9th Cir. 1994)
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1083 (1995).
294 See Tapia, 965 F.2d at 339-40 (holding that illegal SWAT entry could not be attributed
to an official municipal policy under the "failure to train" principle, because the mere
existence of basic police training adhering to the minimum standards established and
governed by state law negated the assertion that "the need for enhanced training was so
obvious, and the inadequacy of training was so likely to result in a constitutional violation
... [that] deliberate indifference .. ." was evident. Id. at 338.).
295 See supra text accompanying notes 87-94 (explaining the SWAT member selection
process).
296 Tapia, 965 F.2d at 339 n.2.
297 See Gilles, supra note 285, at 72-92 (claiming that although the Supreme Court has
"forgotten" about this area of § 1983 jurisprudence, the possibility of utilizing it is still
there).
298 City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (citations omitted).
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showing of "custom" has not been defined by the Supreme Court,299 although a few
police-related cases have successfully used this approach3" by "point[ing] to the
unwritten practices adhered to by rank-and-file municipal officials as the basis for
establishing [a] municipal [custom]."'
To show a SWAT "custom" under this standard a plaintiff will have to show
widespread, permanent, and settled use of specific tactics by a SWAT team. 2 This
custom must also be shown to have a direct causal link to the constitutional
violation. 3 This will be extremely difficult due to the nature of SWAT tactics
being dependent on fact-specific situations."' For example, the practice of having
tow trucks pull off reinforced doors may not be used in every occasion, which
undermines the argument that such a practice is a "permanent" one.3"5 Unless the
plaintiff can show a consistently used practice, one that is applied regardless of
situation, municipal liability will not attach.3°6
d. Summary of SWAT injury redress issues
Plaintiffs injured by SWAT tactics learned from the DOD will find it hard to
succeed under § 1983 litigation against both individual SWAT officers and the
municipalities that employ them. The principles of qualified immunity, "personally
engage," and "policy or custom" for municipal liability, act as barriers to those
seeking legal redress through the federal system.
Though the route of federal constitutional relief may be foreclosed, state and
299 See Gilles, supra note 285, at 49.
300 See id. at 61-62 (citing Mathias v. Bingley, 906 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1990); Jones v.
City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988); Garza v. City of Omaha, 814 F.2d 553 (8th
Cir. 1987)). Gilles also explains the how each case probably would have failed if the
"policy" approach was used. Id. at 60-63.
301 Id at 62.
3' See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127.
303 See Tapia v. City of Greenwood, 965 F.2d 336, 338 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
31 See supra text accompanying notes 55-63 (describing the role mission-specific
planning plays in SWAT operations).
305 See, e.g., Jones, 856 F.2d at 985 (finding that the police practice of keeping "secret
files" was a "custom" for municipal liability purposes).
31 See Gorio v. Block, No.87-6334, 972 F.2d 1339 (Table), 1992 WL 185429, **3 (9th
Cir. Aug. 5, 1992) ("[P]roof of random acts or isolated events are insufficient to establish
custom") (citing Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989)).
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common law tort claims remain available. 7 Victims may still prevail under such
doctrines as assault, battery, false arrest or imprisonment, negligence, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. SWAT actions may also violate state
constitutions, opening another possible avenue of redress." 8
CONCLUSIONS
As was seen glaringly in Waco, guns and heavy-handedness may not always be
the best response to tense situations involving unstable, armed suspects. At the
same time, law enforcement must be allowed to respond to the changing face of
crime in order to maintain the level of safety Americans want to take for granted.3"
Few would argue against training police officers to better protect their
communities. t0 The introduction of emotion and rhetoric, focused on the source
of that training, only clouds the issue of whether the training benefits the
communities those police serve.
SWAT training with the DOD and the use of military techniques, although an
emotional issue, is constitutionally valid. The Fourth Amendment allows an
objectively reasonable police response to societal threats, to bejudged on the basis
of the particular facts at issue. SWAT tactics learned from the DOD will meet this
"reasonableness" test in the majority of situations. However, this fact does not
assure that police using these tactics may never infringe civil liberties.
The danger of using this training becomes evident when victims attempt to
307 See Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 998 (10th Cir. 1996) (Henry, J., concurring)
("[Tihese plaintiffs, possibly wronged, may not rely on a constitutional tort for solace.
Common law or state tort relief is the normal recourse for actions making as little sense as
these."); Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1513-15 (9th Cir. 1991) (analyzing California
tort law claims against FBI SWAT agents, allowed under the Federal Tort Claims Act).
308 For examples of state supreme court rulings on the legality of no-knock entries under
state constitutions, see Poole v. United States, 630 A.2d 1109 (D.C. 1993) cert. denied, 513
U.S. 855; State v. Bamber, 630 So.2d 1048 (Fla. 1994); State v. Attaway, 870 P.2d 103
(N.M. 1994); State v. Schultz, 819 P.2d 762 (Or. 1991).
" The SWAT officers that responded to the 2000 Columbine High School shootings
have been criticized for not acting aggressively enough, and several lawsuits are pending
against team members for this perceived lack of aggression. See Peggy Lowe, SWAT
Member Won't Testify With Threat of Lawsuits By Victims' Families, City Advises Him Not
to Speak to Columbine Commission, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 23, 2000, at
7A.
3"0 As a response to the criticism of the SWAT tactics at Columbine High School, police
departments nationwide are training regular-duty officers to conduct tactical entries and
CQB-based building searches in an effort to be more "proactive" when confronted by a
similar situation. See Josh White, New Tactics Built on Tragic Lessons; County Police
Taught Ways to Intervene in Violent Cases, WASH. POST, May 24,2000, at Prince William
Extra 1; Jane Prendergast, Police Adopting New Approach to Shootings, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, Aug. 29, 2000, at AO.
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redress any resulting constitutional injuries. The exclusionary rule will bar
evidence found to be unreasonably obtained by SWAT teams, but this
"reasonableness" test is often hard for police to fail. Litigation under § 1983
presents a substantial barrier to injured people seeking compensation from SWAT
officers or the municipalities that field them. Jurisprudence in this area gives
substantial deference to police officer decisions,* and effectively insulates
municipalities from liability.
The Constitution has stood as a barrier between governmental abuse and
American civil liberties. Police departments, the thin blue line between lawlessness
and the rule of law, serve as the guardians of those liberties. Those SWAT
members who have sworn to follow this tradition must take care not to fall on the
wrong side of that thin blue line.
KARANR. SINGH
